a14be197eb
- The current architecture is inherently insecure, because you can construct the 'secret' cookie value with values that are available in the database. Thus provides zero protection when a database is dumped/leaked. - This patch implements a new architecture that's inspired from: [Paragonie Initiative](https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies). - Integration testing is added to ensure the new mechanism works. - Removes a setting, because it's not used anymore. (cherry picked from commiteff097448b) [GITEA] rework long-term authentication (squash) add migration Reminder: the migration is run via integration tests as explained in the commit "[DB] run all Forgejo migrations in integration tests" (cherry picked from commit4accf7443c)
25 lines
547 B
Go
25 lines
547 B
Go
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package forgejo_v1_20 //nolint:revive
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import (
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"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/timeutil"
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"xorm.io/xorm"
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)
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type AuthorizationToken struct {
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ID int64 `xorm:"pk autoincr"`
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UID int64 `xorm:"INDEX"`
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LookupKey string `xorm:"INDEX UNIQUE"`
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HashedValidator string
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Expiry timeutil.TimeStamp
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}
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func (AuthorizationToken) TableName() string {
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return "forgejo_auth_token"
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}
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func CreateAuthorizationTokenTable(x *xorm.Engine) error {
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return x.Sync(new(AuthorizationToken))
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}
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